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ABSTRACT 
This paper is the first to investigate the role of work-life balance in financial analysts’ 
performance and career advancement. Using a large sample of Glassdoor reviews by financial 
analysts, we find a significant non-linear relation between work-life balance satisfaction and 
analyst performance and analyst career advancement. Specifically, when work-life balance 
satisfaction is relatively low, an increase in work-life balance is associated with better analyst 
performance and career advancement; however, when perceived work-life balance is already 
high, a further increase in work-life balance is associated with worse analyst performance and 
career advancement. 
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Happy Analysts 
1. Introduction 
Sell-side financial analysts are widely considered to hold one of the most challenging 
professions to achieve work-life balance due to long working hours and a competitive work 
environment. Although financial analysts earn high salaries and have promising career growth 
prospects, they also bear the costs of high stress levels and limited time for self and family. In 
recent years, several investment banks have started programs to promote work-life balance 
among their employees. For example, Morgan Stanley offers month-long paid sabbaticals to 
junior bankers. Goldman Sachs reduced working hours for their junior employees after the 
death of the 21-year-old Bank of America Merrill Lynch intern Moritz Erhardt, who passed 
away after allegedly working nonstop for 72 hours. Although work-life balance (henceforth, 
WLB) is a universal and important issue, the impact of WLB on analysts’ careers has not been 
explored before. The recent emergence of social media such as Glassdoor makes such an 
inquiry possible. This paper investigates the role of WLB of financial analysts in their 
performance and career advancement. 
WLB has been defined as satisfaction at both work and non-work domains with 
minimum conflicts between these two roles (e.g., Braun and Peus 2016). In addition to work 
obligations, employees need to deal with the demands of personal and family life. Ex-ante, the 
role of WLB in analyst performance is unclear. On one hand, WLB can improve job 
performance through two channels. The first is through lower levels of stress. Employees who 
can deal with the demands from their personal and family life are less likely to be stressed, 
which in turn may facilitate job performance such as creative problem solving. The second is 
through higher levels of job satisfaction. Employees who are satisfied with their employers 
tend to have a stronger commitment to the employer, which may also improve job performance. 
On the other hand, WLB may not affect or even hurt job performance. Prior studies suggest 
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that the relation between job satisfaction and job performance is weak in professions with high 
performance standards because the pressure for production provides motivation to perform 
even when the employees are not satisfied with their employers (Judge, Thoresen, Bono, and 
Patton 2001). Given that financial analysts are among the highest-pressure professionals and 
are burdened with a large amount of responsibility, WLB may therefore not have an 
incremental effect on their performance.1 Finally, practices that promote WLB may also hurt 
analyst performance by encouraging lateness and absenteeism to the workplace, which may 
result in lower levels of analyst involvement and effort. 
We hypothesize that an optimal level of WLB for analysts exists and thus the effect of 
WLB on analyst performance depends on the current level of WLB relative to the optimal level. 
While low WLB satisfaction (e.g., extremely long hours in the office) induces stress and 
inefficiency, high WLB may encourage analysts to allocate too much of their resources such 
as time, energy, and cognitive effort to personal or family life. Given that these resources are 
not infinite, the more resources an analyst allocates to her personal life, the fewer resources are 
left for her work. Therefore, we expect that when the current level of WLB is relatively low, 
betterment of WLB improves analyst performance through higher efficiency and better mood. 
In contrast, when the current level of WLB is already high, we expect that an increase in WLB 
decreases analyst performance because the analyst may shift her focus to personal and family 
life.  
To conduct our analyses, we first obtain the names of all U.S. brokers in the I/B/E/S 
database between 2008 and 2016. We manually collect all Glassdoor employee review 
webpages of each broker, identify reviews submitted by analyst employees, and extract data 
on individual reviews. Glassdoor is the largest online resource for prospective job candidates 
                                                          
1 In other words, these are individuals who self-select into a career with less WLB than in many other 
professions, likely because they find satisfaction in the high compensation, excitement of the work, prestige, 
and/or future career opportunities. 
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for employee reviews and potential compensation ranges. Glassdoor allows users to 
anonymously rate the WLB of their firms on a 1 to 5 scale. For each broker and year, we 
aggregate individual analysts’ ratings to measure WLB satisfaction.  
Using a sample of 11,602 Glassdoor reviews by analysts and a sample of I/B/E/S 
analysts who issued at least one earnings forecast, we first examine whether analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy varies with perceived WLB about their employers. We document a non-linear 
relation. On average, analysts’ forecast accuracy reaches the highest level when the WLB 
satisfaction of their employer is around 2.69 out of 5. Positive or negative deviations from this 
level result in lower forecast accuracy. We also find a non-linear relation between WLB and 
analysts’ forecast timeliness. For analysts working for brokers with WLB below (above) the 
inflection point, their forecast timeliness increases (decreases) with WLB satisfaction. Overall, 
these results suggest that analysts’ performance varies with WLB. 
We next investigate the role of WLB in analysts’ career advancement, controlling for 
analysts’ performance. We focus on two primary career outcomes: whether the analyst is voted 
as an All-Star by institutional investors and whether the analyst moves to a larger brokerage 
house (e.g., Hong and Kubik 2003). The results again suggest a non-linear relation. In particular, 
for analysts working at brokerage houses with WLB below (above) the inflection point, their 
likelihood of being voted as an All-Star Analyst and being promoted to larger brokerage houses 
increase (decrease) with WLB. Overall, these results suggest that the WLB shaped by 
employers has a direct impact on analysts’ career outcomes. 
We conduct several additional analyses. In our main analyses, we aggregate individual 
analysts’ ratings at the broker-year level. We extend our analyses to the broker-office-year level. 
To obtain such granular data, we manually collect the LinkedIn profiles of the financial analysts 
in our sample and extract data on their current and historical work locations. We then aggregate 
a broker’s WLB ratings in a given year and city to create a broker-office-year measure. In this 
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way, we are able to test the cross-sectional difference of WLB within a broker.2 The broker-
office-level results are similar to the results at the broker level. We consistently find a non-
linear relation between the broker-office-level WLB and analysts’ performance and career 
advancement. For offices with WLB lower (higher) than the inflection point, increases in WLB 
satisfaction result in more (less) accurate and timely forecasts, and higher (lower) likelihood of 
being voted as All-Star Analysts and being promoted to more resourceful brokers.3 
Our regressions include controls for a host of widely documented analyst, brokerage, 
and firm characteristics. Our inferences are robust after excluding brokers with extremely high 
or low ratings or excluding brokers with few Glassdoor reviews. Our conclusions are also 
robust to using an alternative proxy for analysts’ performance (stock-recommendation 
profitability). We also conduct tests that employ an instrumental-variables approach to better 
identify causality. Taken together, our results suggest that achieving optimal WLB is important 
for both analysts’ performance and their career advancement.  
We make several contributions to research and practice. First, we provide the first large-
sample evidence that reaching the optimal WLB is important, not only for individual financial 
analysts but also for brokerage firms. Second, we contribute to the debate on WLB in the 
financial industry. Our findings suggest that shifting too much focus from work to life can hurt 
analysts’ performance and their career advancement. Third, our findings complement the 
literature on the interaction of job satisfaction and job performance. Prior studies find that job 
satisfaction is positively correlated with stock returns (Edmans 2011; Green, Huang, Wen, and 
Zhou 2018) and that firms with high levels of job satisfaction have low financial reporting risks 
and are less likely to be subjected to SEC fraud enforcement actions and class action lawsuits 
(Ji, Rozenbaum, and Welch 2017). Our results suggest that job satisfaction may not always 
                                                          
2 In other words, these analyses fully control for potential brokerage-house effects. 
3 In additional analyses we also examine the potential moderating effects of analyst gender, seniority, and 
education. We find that gender and seniority matter but that education (i.e., having an MBA degree) does not 
(see Section 5.2 for details). 
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benefit job performance. A high-level job satisfaction may imply lower effort and thus hurt 
employees’ performance and careers.4  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Prior Literature on Work-Life Balance 
In the management literature, WLB is an important component of job satisfaction. WLB 
is the perceived satisfaction between the arrangement of different roles in life (Braun and Peus 
2016). WLB is not limited to family life, such as parenting and partnering, but also includes 
personal activities including sports, travel, and leisure. In addition to work obligations, an 
employee has to deal with the demands of personal and family life and seeks to achieve 
satisfying experiences in all life domains. To promote WLB, firms adopt various types of 
programs such as on-site child care, elder-care services, flextime, job sharing, paid leaves, 
compressed work weeks, shorter work weeks, and work-from-home programs given recent 
developments in telecommuting and social media. Overall, these WLB programs fall into three 
main categories: dependent care, family-stress programs, and flexible work arrangements (see 
Arthur 2003).  
Prior research documents different consequences of WLB. On one hand, WLB can 
improve an employee’s productivity. WLB is an important way to reduce the potential conflicts 
between work and personal life. Such conflicts can yield job stress, such as nervousness and 
anxiety associated with the job, which can affect an employee’s emotional and physical health 
(Shamir and Salomon 1985; Netemeyer, Maxham, and Pullig. 2005; Jennings and McDougald 
2007; Trefalt 2013). In this regard, WLB programs provide relief for non-work concerns. 
                                                          
4 Our study also adds to the growing literature on information aggregation and the wisdom of the crowd. 
Research has examined the role of information aggregation from the online investing community in 
investment strategies (Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang 2014), and the role of online customer reviews in driving 
stock returns (Huang 2018). Our findings suggest that the aggregated opinions of individual financial 
analysts on their employers are associated with individual analysts’ performance.  
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Employees may feel that they are receiving special treatment and in return contribute more 
effort to their employers. Konrad and Mangel (2000) and Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen 
(2011) find that work-life programs improve a firm’s productivity when a higher percentage of 
professional employees are employed. Arthur (2003) documents a positive stock-market 
reaction to firms announcing WLB programs in the Wall Street Journal. He finds that stock 
returns increase 0.36% on the day of a work-family announcement. Netemeyer et al. (2005) 
show that WLB programs improve the performance of customer-service employees by 
reducing their job stress. In addition, prior studies find that long hours do not lead to greater 
productivity and may actually hurt work efficiency (Major, Klein, and Ehrhart 2002). For 
example, Lazear’s (1981) model suggests that an efficient employment contract that maximizes 
productivity should have restrictions on the number of hours of work. 
However, WLB programs can also hurt an employee’s productivity. According to the 
competing-demands theory, both working and personal life have demands on resources such 
as time, energy, and cognitive effort (Konrad and Mangel 2000). All these resources are not 
infinite and can drain at some point. The more resources an employee allocates to personal life, 
the fewer resources are left for work. For example, Blau (1985) suggests that WLB programs 
can reduce work effort, encourage lateness, and even cause absenteeism. Using samples of 
New Zealand firms, Guthrie (2001) and Rich, Lepine, and Crawford (2010) find that work 
involvement has a positive association with firm productivity. To the extent that WLB 
programs reduce the level of work involvement, these programs may hurt employees’ 
performance (Perry-Smith and Blum 2000). Moreover, corporate management may fear that 
their WLB programs provide flexibility, which can result in less stable employment patterns 
and lower organizational commitment from employees. Some prior studies suggest that the 
shift to more flexible job functions (e.g., working-at-home) can reduce employees’ social 
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connections and dissatisfy the social needs of employees and thus hurt their performance 
(Shamir and Salomon 1985). 
In recent years, researchers have started to investigate the role of job satisfaction, 
including WLB, in capital-market settings. For example, Edmans (2011) and Green et al. (2018) 
find a positive association between employee satisfaction and stock returns. Ji et al. (2017) 
document that firms with low levels of job satisfaction are more likely to be subjected to SEC 
fraud enforcement actions and securities class action lawsuits. Khavis and Krishnan (2018) 
show that better WLB is associated with higher audit quality.5 
 
2.2 Work-Life Balance for Financial Analysts 
The investment banking industry, including sell-side equity research, is well-known for 
its long working hours. It is common for equity-research analysts to work 70 to 110 hours each 
week during the earnings season. Importantly, these hours refer to their time spent in the office 
regardless of whether or not they are doing real work (i.e., “face time” is considered important 
in this industry). There are three reasons for financial analysts to stay long hours in the office. 
First, analysts sell their time and attention to clients. When a client pays the brokerage firm 
large fees to advise on a deal, or when an institutional investor calls about the prospects of a 
firm the brokerage firm follows, the analysts are expected to do whatever the client wants at 
any time of the day. Analysts also need to spend time marketing themselves and their covered 
firms to their clients. Second, in the middle of their service, random events, requests, and 
problems arise. Other industries with unpredictable work demands handle these issues by hiring 
teams working in shifts, but this approach does not work as well in the banking industry. Third, 
                                                          
5 Khavis and Krishnan (2018) use a sample of Glassdoor reviews by audit employees to construct WLB 
ratings for audit firms. They examine the linear association between accounting-firm-level WLB and audit 
quality, as measured by clients’ propensity of financial restatements and the likelihood of receiving a going-
concern opinion, and they find a positive association between WLB and audit quality. See also Buchheit, 
Dalton, Harp, and Hollingsworth (2016). 
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working long hours is deeply embedded into the culture of financial service firms. Given this 
long-hour practice, it is challenging for analysts to rest enough and/or spend time on their own 
personal interests or family.  
After the financial crisis, investment banks had to cut costs and had difficulty relying 
on large bonuses to keep their junior employees. Instead, the banks needed to find other ways, 
such as improving WLB, to retain their financial analysts. In recognition of these issues, in 
recent years, brokerage firms have started various programs to promote WLB among their 
employees. For example, UBS permits investment bankers to take at least two hours of personal 
time each week. JPMorgan Chase asks their employees to take weekends off unless they are 
working on a major deal. Morgan Stanley offers month-long paid sabbaticals to junior bankers. 
Goldman Sachs has reduced working hours for their junior employees after a Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch intern died after allegedly working 72 hours without sleep.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
2.3.1 Work-Life Balance and Analysts’ Performance 
The effect of WLB satisfaction on an analyst’s performance is unclear. WLB can 
improve analysts’ job performance through two channels. The first is through lower levels of 
stress. Analysts who can balance their multiple roles in personal and family life are less likely 
to be stressed and in a bad mood at work, which in turn can facilitate job performance such as 
creative problem solving (Organ 1977; Petty, McGee, and Cavender 1984; Ostroff 1992; Fisher 
2003). The second is through higher levels of job satisfaction. Analysts who are satisfied with 
WLB may have a stronger commitment to their employer, which in turn improves job 
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performance (Futrell and Parasuraman 1984; Banker, Konstans, and Mashruwala 2000; Judge 
et al. 2001; Harter, Frank, and Hayes 2002).  
It is also possible that WLB satisfaction may not improve or even hurt an analyst’s job 
performance. Some prior research suggests that the relation between job satisfaction and job 
performance is weak in professions with high performance standards because the pressure for 
production provides motivation to perform even when the employees are not satisfied with 
their employers (Brayfield and Crockett 1955; Judge et al. 2001; Christen, Iyer, and Soberman 
2006). Given that financial analysts are among the highest-pressure professionals and are 
burdened with a large amount of responsibility, WLB may not have an incremental effect on 
their performance. Furthermore, WLB might hurt job performance because analysts have 
limited resources including time, energy, and effort (Konrad and Mangel 2000). When they 
allocate more resources to “life,” they have to allocate fewer resources to work. In this regard, 
at some point further WLB satisfaction may decrease an analyst’s work involvement and thus 
hurt their performance.  
Prior studies suggest that an optimal level of work hours might exist (Lazear 1981; 
Major et al. 2002). Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that the effect of WLB on 
an analyst’s performance depends on the current level of WLB relative to the optimal level. 
We expect that when WLB satisfaction is relatively low, an increase in WLB satisfaction can 
improve an analyst’s efficiency and mood and thus lead to better performance. In contrast, 
when the WLB satisfaction is already high, we expect that a further increase in WLB causes 
an analyst to shift too much focus to personal and family life, thus leading to worse 
performance. Summarizing the preceding discussion, our first hypothesis is (stated in the 
alternative form): 
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H1: Additional work-life balance improves analysts’ performance when work-life 
balance is low, but decreases analysts’ performance when work-life balance is high. 
 
2.3.2 Work-Life Balance and Analysts’ Career Advancement 
WLB satisfaction has the potential to also influence the career outcomes of financial 
analysts. Analysts are known to frequently interact with their clients and are expected to meet 
customer requests and demands. In a recent survey by Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015), 
consistent with Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011) and Yin and Zhang (2014), 83% of 
financial analysts indicate that broker or client votes of approval are important for analyst 
career opportunities. Analysts’ interactions with clients have a high degree of discretion and 
thus provide opportunities for attitudes and motives to affect their behavior (Judge et al. 2001). 
Therefore, analysts with better WLB can potentially pass their good mood onto their clients 
and build better client relationships. Similarly, analysts with better WLB may also build closer 
relationships with other connections who can in turn provide financial analysts with 
information about job opportunities and help reduce information asymmetry between analysts 
and potential employers (Li, Lin, and Lu 2018). Taken together, analysts with better WLB 
satisfaction are likely to communicate better with clients and other connections, and these 
happier clients and connections are more likely to help them win All-Star awards or get 
promoted to larger firms (Cook 2005). However, the more analysts allocate their time, energy, 
and effort to their personal life, the fewer resources are left for them to maintain their 
relationships with clients and connections. For example, Shamir and Salomon (1985) indicate 
that the shift to more flexible job functions (e.g., working-at-home) can reduce the time to 
maintain employees’ social connections.  
Overall, our prediction is that the effect of WLB on an analyst’s career advancement 
depends on the current level of WLB satisfaction relative to the optimal level. We expect that 
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when the level of WLB satisfaction is relatively low, increases in WLB satisfaction enhance 
the likelihood of financial analysts to be voted as All-Stars or to be promoted to a larger 
brokerage firm. In contrast, when the level of WLB satisfaction is already high, we expect that 
further WLB satisfaction decreases the likelihood of financial analysts to be voted as All-Stars 
or obtain a position with a larger brokerage firm. To summarize, our second hypothesis is as 
follows (stated in the alternative form): 
 
H2: Additional work-life balance helps analysts’ career advancement when work-life 
balance is low, but hurts analysts’ career advancement when work-life balance is high. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Variable Measurement 
3.1 Sample-Selection Procedures 
Table 1 summarizes the sample-selection procedures. We obtain the names of all of the 
U.S. brokers in the I/B/E/S database between 2008 and 2016. We manually collect 11,602 
Glassdoor employee review webpages submitted by analysts of these brokers and extract data 
from individual reviews.6 We then merge these Glassdoor reviews with the I/B/E/S dataset and 
further restrict the sample to meet the following criteria: (1) with I/B/E/S information to 
calculate earnings forecast errors; (2) with financial data such as market value and market-to-
book ratio; (3) with sufficient information to calculate control variables. These procedures 
result in an initial sample of 140,202 analyst-firm-year observations consisting of 5,336 
analysts and 3,519 firms for the tests of analyst performance. 7 
                                                          
6  To identify the relevant Glassdoor employee reviews, we search for the following keywords in an 
employee’s job title: analyst, associate, capital market, derivative, equity, fixed income, quantitative, 
research, securities, and valuation. Therefore, analysts here broadly refer to employees in a brokerage firm’s 
research department. 
7 It is unlikely that all of the I/B/E/S analysts in our sample submit a review to Glassdoor. Some of these 
Glassdoor reviews may be submitted by analysts who are not in the I/B/E/S database or by other members 
in an analyst team. 
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3.2 Main Variables 
3.2.1 Work-Life Balance Ratings 
Glassdoor is the largest online resource for prospective job candidates for employee 
reviews and compensation information. Glassdoor allows users to anonymously rate various 
aspects of their firms on a 1 to 5 scale, for instance, overall rating, company benefits, WLB, 
and senior management.8 We aggregate all ratings for each broker in a given year to create a 
broker-year measure.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of Glassdoor ratings for the broker-year 
combinations in our sample. During our sample period, there are 551 broker-years with analyst 
employee ratings. Comparing the ratings by analyst employees with those by non-analyst 
employees, we find that analyst employees have lower ratings for WLB but higher ratings for 
senior management, culture and values, career opportunities, and outlook. 9  Untabulated 
analyses show that analysts tend to provide more comprehensive reviews that cover both the 
good and the bad about the company, suggesting that their ratings are based on more careful 
evaluations. In addition, analysts’ ratings for a given broker seem to be quite stable over time. 
Our WLB measure is the average WLB rating submitted by analyst employees for a 
given brokerage firm in year t.10,11 We focus on WLB satisfaction instead of other aspects in 
                                                          
8 These employee reviews are anonymous; therefore, they cannot match to individual analysts.  
9 We collect an additional 55,012 non-analyst employee reviews for this analysis. The comparison is based 
on 464 broker-years with both analyst and non-analyst employee ratings. 
10 In an untabulated analysis, we compare the ratings by current analyst employees with those by former 
analyst employees. We find that the ratings by the two groups are similar in all aspects. Therefore, to increase 
the precision of the WLB measure, we use both current and former analyst employee ratings to measure 
WLB at the broker level. 
11 Although we are unable to match individual analysts’ WLB ratings to their performance and career 
outcomes, given that individual analysts’ WLB is affected by their employers, it is important to study the 
effect of broker-level WLB before going further into analyst-level WLB. The use of aggregated ratings is 
both consistent with prior literature and appropriate because analysts within the same firm are sufficiently 
homogenous so that the aggregation process can remove random individual differences and result in a more 
accurate broker-level measure (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders 1990; Ostroff 1992, 1993). In Section 
5.1 we examine performance and career outcomes at the broker-office level. 
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job satisfaction of financial analysts for three reasons. First, job satisfaction is a broad 
definition that includes compensation, benefits, job growth, WLB, and culture. Focusing on 
one aspect, such as WLB, allows us to isolate the effects from other aspects of job satisfaction 
(see Section 5.5). Second, WLB is a universal and important issue in the financial industry. 
Unlike other professions that may more easily accommodate a home-based work style (e.g., 
some IT engineers who can work with a computer no matter where they are), working long and 
potentially uncertain hours in the office is the culture in the financial services industry, and it 
is important to understand how WLB may affect analyst performance. Third, the implications 
of WLB in the financial services industry is unclear, because there are tradeoffs in 
implementing WLB programs. As such, our study has implications for both academia and 
practice. 
 
3.2.2 Analyst Performance Measures 
We construct two primary proxies for analyst performance: earnings forecast accuracy 
and earnings forecast timeliness. Earnings forecast accuracy is measured by Forecast Error, 
defined as the absolute value of the analyst’s initial earnings forecast for firm j minus firm j’s 
actual EPS in year t scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. Following Clement 
and Tse (2003), Forecast Error is standardized to range from 0 to 1 to control for firm-year 
effects. Specifically, the standardized relative Forecast Error for analyst i following firm j in 
year t is calculated as [Forecast Errori,j,t – min(Forecast Errorj,t)]/[max(Forecast Errorj,t) – 
min(Forecast Errorj,t)], where max(Forecast Errorj,t) and min(Forecast Errorj,t) denote, 
respectively, the largest and smallest earnings forecast errors of all of the analysts following 
firm j in year t. By construction, a higher value of relative Forecast Error indicates that the 
earnings forecast is less accurate.  
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Earnings forecast timeliness is measured by Forecast Timeliness, defined as the natural 
logarithm of the number of days between the analyst’s initial earnings forecast for firm j and 
the announcement date of firm j’s actual EPS in year t. Forecast Timeliness is also standardized 
to range from 0 to 1 for a given firm and year. By construction, a higher value of relative 
Forecast Timeliness indicates that the earnings forecast is issued earlier in a year and therefore 
is timelier. Prior studies find that timelier earnings forecasts are associated with larger market 
reactions (e.g., Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin 2014). 
 
3.2.3 Analyst Career Outcome Measures 
To examine the role of WLB in analysts’ career advancement, we rely on Institutional 
Investor’s All-Star Analyst award status and a promotion measure constructed based on the 
brokerage firm size. Each year, Institutional Investor magazine asks institutional investors to 
vote for the top sell-side equity analysts. We create an indicator variable (AA Award) that is set 
to one if the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up in her industry by Institutional 
Investor in year t and zero otherwise. For analyst promotion, we follow Hong and Kubik (2003) 
and create an indicator variable (Promotion) that is set to one if the analyst moves to a top-
decile-size brokerage firm in year t and zero otherwise.12 
 
3.2.4 Control Variables 
Following the analyst literature (e.g., Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; Lim 
2001; Clement and Tse 2003), in our tests of analyst performance, we control for earnings 
forecast frequency (Forecast Frequency), brokerage firm size (Broker Size), number of firms 
followed (Number of Firms), number of industries followed (Number of Industries), and firm 
                                                          
12 We acknowledge that this measure does not consider within-brokerage firm advancements. However, it is 
a common proxy for promotion in the analyst literature (e.g., Leone and Wu 2007; Kumar 2010; Hilary and 
Hsu 2013; Li, Lin, and Lu 2018). In Section 5.7 we consider additional career outcomes. 
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experience (Firm Experience), all of which are standardized to range from 0 to 1. In our tests 
of career advancement, we additionally control for average firm size (Size), average market-
to-book ratio (MTB), and average market beta (Beta) of the firms in the analyst’s research 
portfolio. We also control for forecast characteristics such as average relative forecast accuracy 
(Forecast Accuracy), average relative forecast boldness (Forecast Boldness), and average 
forecast optimism (Forecast Optimism). The Appendix contains a complete list of variable 
definitions. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyst 
performance tests. In line with prior findings, the median analyst issues four earnings forecasts 
for a firm, follows seventeen firms within three two-digit SIC industries, and has four years of 
client-firm-specific experience.  
Panel B of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyst 
career-outcome tests. In this sample, 11.9% of the analysts are awarded All-Stars and 1.9% of 
the analysts move to a top-decile-size brokerage firm. We winsorize the continuous variables 
at the top and bottom 1%.  
 
4. Research Design and Empirical Results 
4.1 Work-Life Balance and Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
H1 predicts that WLB satisfaction will have a non-linear relation with analyst 
performance. To test this hypothesis, we first examine the effect of WLB satisfaction on 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors, controlling for other determinants including brokerage firm 
size, number of firms followed, number of industries followed, firm experience, forecast 
frequency, and forecast timeliness. As mentioned in Section 3, we rely on standardized 
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earnings forecast errors to control for firm-year effects. 13  Specifically, we estimate the 
following quadratic model (e.g., McConnell and Servaes 1990; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Collin-
Dufresne et al. 2001; Wyatt 2005; Hillary and Huang 2018):  
 
Forecast Error = α + β1 ∙ Work-Life Balance + β2 ∙ Work-Life Balance2  
                                + β3 ∙ Broker Size + β4 ∙ Number of Industries  
                                                + β5 ∙ Number of Firms + β6 ∙ Firm Experience  
                                +      β7 ∙ Forecast Frequency + β8 ∙ Forecast Timeliness + ε                    (1A) 
 
where Work-Life Balance denotes the average WLB rating submitted by analysts for a given 
brokerage firm in year t. Work-Life Balance2 is the squared term of Work-Life Balance. We 
include the squared term because we expect a non-linear relation between Work-Life Balance 
and Forecast Error. A positive (negative) coefficient on Work-Life Balance2 would indicate a 
convex (concave) relation between WLB and analyst forecast error.14  
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the result from estimating Equation (1A) without the 
squared term of Work-Life Balance. In this specification, Work-Life Balance is positive and 
significant. More importantly, column 3 of Table 4 reports the full result from estimating 
Equation (1A). The result shows that a U-shaped relation exists between WLB and analysts’ 
forecast error. Both coefficients of Work-Life Balance and Work-Life Balance2 are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with negative and positive signs, respectively. These findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis that the association between WLB satisfaction and forecast 
accuracy is different at high and low levels of WLB satisfaction. 
                                                          
13 In untabulated tests, we explicitly control for firm size, market-to-book ratio, and firm performance, and 
our inferences are robust. 
14 In robustness tests, we use spline specifications that include three piecewise-linear terms (Morck et al. 
1988; Cho 1998; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Davies et al. 2005). Our conclusions are unaltered with this 
alternative specification. 
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We provide a descriptive plot in Panel A of Figure 1 to help with the interpretation of 
these results. When Work-Life Balance is lower than the inflection point (there are 91 broker-
years in this case), Forecast Error decreases with Work-Life Balance. However, after the 
inflection point (there are 460 broker-years in this case), Forecast Error increases with Work-
Life Balance. To calculate the inflection point, we begin with estimating the partial derivative 
of Table 4, column 3, with respect to Work-Life Balance and setting it equal to zero. At the 
inflection point, the marginal effect of Work-Life Balance should be equal to zero (since the 
inflection point is the apex of the curve). The partial derivative is equal to -0.0340 + 2 × 0.0063 
× Work-Life Balance = 0. Solving for Work-Life Balance gives us 2.69.  
To help interpret the economic magnitude of the effect we document, we further create 
two variables: |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| (|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|) is the absolute 
value of the difference between a brokerage firm’s rating and the WLB level at the inflection 
point when the broker’s rating is higher (lower) than the inflection point. Then we estimate the 
following model: 
 
Forecast Error = α + β1 ∙ |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|  
                               + β2 ∙ |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| + β3 ∙ Broker Size  
                               + β4 ∙ Number of Industries + β5 ∙ Number of Firms  
                               + β6 ∙ Firm Experience + β7 ∙ Forecast Frequency  
                               +    β8 ∙ Forecast Timeliness + ε                                                                 (1B) 
                                          
In column 5 of Table 4, we find the coefficient estimates on |Abn. Pos. Work-Life 
Balance| and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| are both positive and significant, consistent with 
our prior finding that the inflection point of Work-Life Balance is estimated to be approximately 
2.69 out of 5. These results suggest that a positive (negative) one-point deviation from the 
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inflection point of Work-Life Balance is associated with a 1.13% (0.95%) increase in the 
relative Forecast Error, which is approximately 3.5% (2.9%) of the standard deviation of the 
relative Forecast Error. We interpret these estimates to be both plausible and economically 
significant.  
 
4.2 Work-Life Balance and Earnings Forecast Timeliness 
We next examine whether WLB satisfaction has a non-linear relation with earnings 
forecast timeliness. To test this hypothesis, we regress Forecast Timeliness on WLB and its 
squared term, controlling for brokerage firm size, number of firms followed, number of 
industries followed, and firm experience. We estimate the following models: 
 
Forecast Timeliness = α + β1 ∙ Work-Life Balance + β2 ∙ Work-Life Balance2  
                                    + β3 ∙ Broker Size + β4 ∙ Number of Industries  
                                                      +      β5 ∙ Number of Firms + β6 ∙ Firm Experience + ε                           (2A)                              
 
Forecast Timeliness = α + β1 ∙ |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|  
                                    + β2 ∙ |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| + β3 ∙ Broker Size  
                                    + β4 ∙ Number of Industries + β5 ∙ Number of Firms  
                                                      +    β6 ∙ Firm Experience + ε                                                                 (2B) 
 
Column 2 of Table 4 reports the result from estimating Equation (2A) without the 
squared term of Work-Life Balance. We find that coefficient estimate on Work-Life Balance is 
insignificant. On the surface, the result seems to suggest that the WLB rating does not have an 
association with Forecast Timeliness. Column 4 of Table 4 reports the full result from 
estimating Equation (2A). The result shows that an inverted U-shaped relation exists between 
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WLB satisfaction and analysts’ earnings forecast timeliness. Both coefficients of Work-Life 
Balance and Work-Life Balance2 are statistically significant at the 1% level (with positive and 
negative signs, respectively).  
In Panel B of Figure 1, we can see that when WLB is relatively low, Forecast 
Timeliness is lower than at the inflection point of WLB, indicating that earnings forecasts are 
issued later in a year. However, after the inflection point, we also find lower Forecast 
Timeliness than at the inflection point. To help interpret the economic magnitude, we estimate 
Equation (2B) and report the results in column 6 of Table 4. We find that the coefficient 
estimates on |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| are both 
negative and significant, consistent with the existence of an optimal WLB level. In economic 
terms, a positive (negative) one-point deviation from the inflection point is associated with a 
1.91% (1.94%) decrease in the relative Forecast Timeliness, which is approximately 6.0% (6.1% 
of the standard deviation of Forecast Timeliness). 
 
4.3 Work-Life Balance and Analyst Career Outcomes 
H2 predicts that WLB satisfaction has a non-linear relation on analysts’ career 
outcomes. We examine whether additional WLB satisfaction helps analysts to be voted as All-
Stars or to be promoted to a large brokerage firm when the current WLB is relatively low, and 
whether additional WLB decreases the likelihood for analysts to be voted as All-Stars or to be 
promoted to a large brokerage firm when the current WLB satisfaction is already high. To test 
this hypothesis, we estimate the following probit models: 
 
Career Outcome = α + β1 ∙ Work-Life Balance + β2 ∙ Work-Life Balance2  
                                  + β3 ∙ Forecast Accuracy + β4 ∙ Forecast Boldness  
                                  + β5 ∙ Forecast Optimism + β6 ∙ Forecast Frequency  
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                                  + β7 ∙ Forecast Timeliness + β8 ∙ Broker Size  
                                  + β9 ∙ Number of Industries + β10 ∙ Number of Firms  
                                                   + β11 ∙ Firm Experience + β12 ∙ Beta + β13 ∙ Firm Size  
                                  +   β14 ∙ Market-to-Book + Year Fixed Effects + ε                                 (3A) 
 
Career Outcome = α + β1 ∙ |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|  
                                  + β2 ∙ |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| + β3 ∙ Forecast Accuracy  
                                                   + β4 ∙ Forecast Boldness + β5 ∙ Forecast Optimism  
                                  + β6 ∙ Forecast Frequency + β7 ∙ Forecast Timeliness  
                                  + β8 ∙ Broker Size + β9 ∙ Number of Industries  
                                                   + β10 ∙ Number of Firms + β11 ∙ Firm Experience + β12 ∙ Beta  
                                  +   β13 ∙ Firm Size + β14 ∙ Market-to-Book + Year Fixed Effects + ε     (3B) 
                                                                                
where Career Outcome denotes AA_Award or Promote. AA_Award is an analyst’s All-
American Research Team status, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked in the 
top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor in her industry in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Promotion proxies for analyst promotion to a large brokerage firm and is measured as an 
indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves to a top-decile-size brokerage firm in year t, 
and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the Appendix.  
Table 5 reports the results from estimating Equation (3A) and (3B).15 In columns 1 and 
2, before including Work-Life Balance2, the coefficient estimate on Work-Life Balance is 
insignificant. However, columns 3 and 4 show that an inverted U-shaped relation exists 
between WLB satisfaction and analysts’ career outcomes. Both coefficients of Work-Life 
                                                          
15 The lower sample size in Table 5 compared with Table 4 is explained by the fact that whereas the 
performance tests are at the analyst-firm-year level, the career-outcome tests are at the analyst-year level. 
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Balance and Work-Life Balance2 are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. These 
results are consistent with H2 that WLB satisfaction has a non-linear effect on analysts’ career 
advancement. 
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, we find the coefficient estimates on |Abn. Pos. Work-
Life Balance| and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| are both negative and significant, consistent 
with the existence of optimal work-life balance level. In economic terms, a positive (negative) 
one-point deviation from the estimated inflection point is associated with a 4.6% (5.2%) 
decrease in the likelihood of winning an All-Star Analyst award, which is approximately 14.2% 
(16.1%) of the standard deviation of winning an AA Award.16 Similarly, a positive (negative) 
one-point deviation from the estimated inflection point is associated with a 2.2% (2.7%) 
decrease in the likelihood of being promoted to a large brokerage firm, which is approximately 
16.2% (19.9%) of the standard deviation of Promotion.17 
In the tests of career advancement, we control for analysts’ performance at the portfolio 
level such as earnings forecast accuracy and timeliness, as well as other earnings forecast 
characteristics such as boldness, optimism, and frequency. The results suggest that, earnings 
forecast timeliness is valued by both institutional investors and prospective employers. 
Earnings forecast frequency (accuracy) is additionally valued by institutional investors 
(prospective employers). Importantly, even after controlling for analysts’ performance, WLB 
satisfaction still has an incremental effect on analysts’ career advancement. We also control for 
analysts’ research-portfolio characteristics and consistently find that analysts who follow more 
firms and larger firms tend to have better career outcomes (which is consistent with prior 
literature). 
 
                                                          
16 Alternatively, these numbers correspond to 38.7% and 43.7% of the mean AA Award, respectively. 
17 Alternatively, these numbers correspond to 115.8% and 142.1% of the mean Promotion, respectively. 
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5. Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
5.1 Work-Life Balance Measured at the Broker-Office Level 
In our main analyses, we focus on broker-level WLB to examine the role of WLB in an 
analyst’s performance and career path. We extend our study to the broker-office level. We 
manually collect the LinkedIn profiles of financial analysts in our sample and extract data on 
their current and historical locations. We then aggregate all analyst employees’ WLB ratings 
in a given year and city to create a broker-office-year measure. In this way, we are able to test 
the cross-sectional difference of WLB within a broker. We re-estimate Equations (1) – (3) using 
the office-level WLB ratings. 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, Panel A, we find a non-linear U-shaped relation between 
WLB satisfaction and analysts’ performance - both coefficients of Work-Life Balance and 
Work-Life Balance2 are statistically significant. In columns 3 and 4, we further find that both 
coefficient estimates of |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| are 
statistically significant.  
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, Panel B, we consistently find an inverted U-shaped 
relation between WLB satisfaction and analysts’ career outcomes, with both coefficients of 
Work-Life Balance and Work-Life Balance2 being statistically significant. In columns 3 and 4, 
the coefficient estimates on |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| 
are significant in three out of four cases.  
Overall, the results at the broker-office-level are similar to those at the broker level. We 
document a non-linear association between WLB satisfaction and analysts’ performance and 
career advancement. In particular, for analysts working at offices with relatively low (high) 
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level of perceived WLB, an increase in WLB can benefit (hurt) their performance and career 
outcomes.18 
 
5.2 Potential Moderating Effects of Personal Characteristics 
We further explore potential moderating effects of analyst-specific personal 
characteristics. We examine the role of gender, level of seniority, and education (i.e., whether 
or not the analyst has an MBA degree).  
To investigate the moderating effect of gender, we construct a matched sample of male 
and female analysts because females only account for 10% of the analysts in our sample. 
Specifically, each female analyst is randomly matched with a male analyst working for the 
same broker and who follows the same industry in the same year. Then, we modify Equations 
(1), (2), and (3) by including a Female indicator and its interactions with Work-Life Balance, 
Work-Life Balance2, |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|, and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|. In 
columns 1 and 3 of Table 7, Panel A, we find that WLB satisfaction affects both female and 
male analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. However, in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7, Panel A, 
we find that unlike male analysts, female analysts’ earnings forecast timeliness is not affected 
by WLB satisfaction. Furthermore, the results of Table 7, Panel B, collectively suggest that 
female analysts’ career advancement is less affected by WLB satisfaction. This is consistent 
with Kumar (2010) who suggests that female analysts are a special group of competitive and 
less risk-averse females who choose to pursue a career in a male-dominated industry. Due to 
this self-selection process, females are likely to be more skillful and stronger than male 
counterpart analysts. 
                                                          
18 In untabulated tests, we control for WLB in different cities by including city fixed effects in all regressions. 
Our inferences are robust. 
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When we focus on the level of seniority of the analysts, we find that junior analysts’ 
performance and external promotion are less affected by WLB relative to senior analysts 
(untabulated). This is likely because junior analysts have higher motivation to perform. Finally, 
we do not find any differential effects for analysts with and without an MBA degree 
(untabulated). 
 
5.3 Alternative Performance Measure: Stock-Recommendation Profitability 
In this section, we use stock-recommendation profitability as an alternative measure for 
analysts’ performance. We estimate the following OLS models separately for buy and sell 
recommendations, where buy (sell) recommendations include analysts’ strong buy and buy 
(hold, sell, and strong sell) recommendations. 
 
BHAR = α + β1 ∙ Work-Life Balance + β2 ∙ Work-Life Balance2  
                  + β3 ∙ Broker Size + β4 ∙ Number of Industries + β5 ∙ Number of Firms  
                  + β6 ∙ Firm Experience + β7 ∙ Firm Size + β8 ∙ Market-to-Book + β9 ∙ Beta  
                  + Industry Fixed Effects + ε                                                                                (4A) 
 
BHAR = α + β1 ∙ |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| + β2 ∙ |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|  
                  + β3 ∙ Broker Size + β4 ∙ Number of Industries + β5 ∙ Number of Firms  
                  + β6 ∙ Firm Experience + β7 ∙ Firm Size + β8 ∙ Market-to-Book + β9 ∙ Beta  
                  + Industry Fixed Effects + ε                                                                                (4B) 
 
where BHAR is the natural logarithm of one plus the buy-and-hold market-adjusted return to 
the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm j. The window for calculating BHAR is the 
analyst’s [current recommendation date + 2 days, next recommendation date – 2 days]. 
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Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010), we let a recommendation expire if it is not 
revised or reiterated within 365 days. 
In column 1 of Table 8, we find that an inverted U-shaped relation exists between WLB 
and buy-recommendation profitability. In column 2, the results show that the coefficient 
estimates on |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| and |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| are both 
negative and significant, suggesting that deviations from the inflection point of WLB level are 
associated with less profitable buy recommendations and thus worse analyst performance. 
However, in columns 3 and 4, we do not find significant effects for analysts’ sell 
recommendations.19 
 
5.4 Excluding Extreme Ratings 
Our inferences are unaltered after excluding broker-years with extremely high or low 
ratings or with few reviews (untabulated). Specifically, our conclusions hold after excluding 
(1) broker-years with a rating lower than 2 or higher than 4, (2) broker-years with a rating lower 
than 2.5 or higher than 3.5, or (3) broker-years with fewer than 2, 3, 4, or 5 Glassdoor reviews.20 
 
5.5 Controlling for Other Glassdoor Ratings 
Glassdoor also allows users to rate other aspects of their firms, including Company 
Benefits, Senior Management, Culture & Values, Career Opportunities, Approval of CEO, 
Outlook, and Recommend to a Friend. In order to ensure that our WLB measure is not merely 
                                                          
19 A possible explanation is that the literature consistently shows a much stronger market response to sell 
recommendations (i.e., there may be less room for incremental effects of WLB). 
20 Specifically, in the analyst-career-outcome sample, 92.04% of the analyst-years are associated with a WLB 
rating between 2 and 4, 60.8% are associated with a rating between 2.5 and 3.5, and 70.93% are associated 
with a rating calculated based on 5 or more Glassdoor reviews. The percentages are similar for the analyst-
performance sample.  
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a subset of these other ratings, we include all ratings in the same regression. No inferences are 
affected (untabulated).21 
 
5.6 Potential Remaining Endogeneity (IV) 
Although our empirical tests include a number of control variables motivated by prior 
research and we use standardized measures that embed firm-year controls, we acknowledge 
that analyst performance could also affect their WLB satisfaction. Therefore, we employ an 
instrumental-variable approach to better identify causality (i.e., to control for unobservable 
potentially correlated omitted variables). Our instruments are Best State, an indicator for 
brokerage firms located in the best state for living (Massachusetts; USA Today 2016) and Worst 
Traffic City, an indicator for brokers located in the worst city for traffic (Los Angeles; TomTom 
Traffic Index). These instruments satisfy both the relevance (with F-statistics well above the 
critical value) and exclusion criteria (with both instruments being statistically insignificant 
when added to the original model, consistent with the instruments being uncorrelated with the 
error term). 
In the first stage, we regress Work-Life Balance and Work-Life Balance2 on Best State, 
Worst Traffic City, and all the other independent variables in the corresponding regression 
models. We obtain the predicted values from the first stage. In the second stage, we regress 
proxies for performance and career advancement on predicted Work-Life Balance and Work-
Life Balance2. In untabulated tests, our conclusions are unaltered.  
                                                          
21 We also test whether these other Glassdoor ratings have a moderating effect on WLB. Not surprisingly, 
there is some evidence that the effects for WLB are attenuated when the employer’s overall ratings or career 
opportunities are high. 
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5.7 Alternative Career Outcome Measures 
Although we rely on a long line of analyst research in choosing to focus on analysts 
being awarded the All-Star status and being promoted to larger brokerage firms, clearly other 
outcome variables exist. For example, the motivation behind some of the WLB programs in 
banks is not only to improve performance but also to increase employee retention. 
Consequently, we additionally test for the effects on analyst retention. 22  In untabulated 
analyses we observe that U-shaped relations exist also for employee retention. 
Further, we examine whether analysts tend to move to brokerage firms with high WLB 
satisfaction. We find that when their current WLB satisfaction is low (high), analysts are indeed 
attracted (not attracted) by alternative employers who value WLB (untabulated). 
 
5.8 Alternative Specification for Non-Linearity 
Given the possibility of a non-linear association, we test our hypothesis using quadratic 
regressions in the main analyses (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Himmelberg et al. 1999; 
Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Wyatt 2005; Hillary and Huang 2018). In robustness tests, we use 
spline regressions to ensure that our assumption of nonlinearity is appropriate (Morck et al. 
1988; Cho 1998; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Davies et al. 2005). Spline regressions do not assume 
the association to be of a specific form, thus they are useful in establishing the characteristics 
of a non-linear association. In untabulated tests, our inferences are unaffected. Spline 
regressions require specifying knots at which the slope of the function changes and thus may 
be affected by the choice of knots. In contrast, the quadratic regressions do not impose such 
requirements. Therefore, spline regressions and quadratic regressions complement each other 
                                                          
22 Specifically, analyst retention is an indicator variable set to one if the analyst works for the same brokerage 
firm in the next year, and zero otherwise. 
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and increase the reliability of our inferences. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of financial analysts’ work-life balance in their 
performance and career advancement. Using an extensive sample of Glassdoor reviews by 
financial analysts, we find that when work-life balance satisfaction is relatively low, an increase 
in work-life balance satisfaction improves performance and is associated with better career 
advancement of analysts; however, when work-life balance satisfaction is already high, an 
increase in work-life balance satisfaction is associated with worse performance and career 
advancement. Collectively, our results suggest a significant non-linear effect of work-life 
balance on analysts’ performance and career advancement. 
Our paper contributes to the debate on work-life balance in the financial industry. The 
findings suggest that shifting too many resources from work or personal life can hurt analysts’ 
performance and career advancement. This study also contributes to the literature on the 
interaction of job satisfaction and job performance, as well as the growing literature on 
information aggregation and the wisdom of the crowd. Overall, our article provides the first 
large-sample evidence that reaching the optimal work-life balance is important not only for 
individuals but also for employers in the brokerage industry.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables  
Forecast Error Earnings forecast error, which is calculated as the absolute value of the 
analyst’s initial earnings forecast for firm i minus firm i’s actual EPS in 
year t scaled by the stock price at the beginning of year t.  
Forecast Timeliness Earnings forecast timeliness, which is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the number of days between the analyst’s initial earnings forecast for firm 
j and the announcement date of firm j’s actual EPS in year t. 
AA_Award  All-Star Analyst award, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is 
ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor in year t 
and zero otherwise. 
Promote Analyst promotion to a large brokerage firm, an indicator variable set to 
one if the analyst moves to a top-decile-size brokerage firm in year t and 
zero otherwise. 
Key independent variable  
Work-Life Balance The average work-life balance rating received by the analyst’s brokerage 
firm from analysts in year t. 
Control variables  
Forecast Frequency Earnings forecast frequency, which is calculated as the number of earnings 
forecasts issued by the analyst for firm j in year t. 
Broker Size Brokerage firm size, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts employed by the sell-side firm in year t. 
Number of Industries Number of 2-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. 
Number of Firms Number of firms the analyst follows in year t. 
Firm Experience Firm-specific experience, which is defined as the number of years in which 
the analyst has issued at least one earnings forecast for firm j before year 
t. 
Forecast Accuracy The average relative accuracy of earnings forecasts (i.e., negative one 
times Forecast Error) that the analyst issues on the covered firms between 
October of year t-1 and September of year t. 
Forecast Boldness The average relative boldness (i.e., the absolute deviation from consensus 
forecast) of earnings forecasts that the analyst issues on the covered firms 
between October of year t-1 and September of year t. 
Forecast Optimism The average forecast optimism (i.e., an indicator variable equal to one if 
the analyst forecast is higher than consensus forecast) of earnings forecasts 
that the analyst issues on the covered firms between October of year t-1 
and September of year t. 
Beta The average market beta of the analyst’s covered firms during year t. 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the average market value of the analyst’s covered 
firms at the end of year t-1. 
Market-to-Book The average market-to-book ratio of the analyst’s covered firms at the end 
of year t-1. 
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Figure 1 
Descriptive Plot - Work-Life Balance and Analyst Performance 
 
Panel A: Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 
 
Panel B: Earnings Forecast Timeliness  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
 
Sample selection criteria 
Number 
of analyst 
firm-years 
Number 
of firms 
Number 
of 
analysts 
Analyst firm-years with EPS forecasts, 2008-2016 317,310 5,572 8,847 
Retain: brokerage firms with analysts’ work-life balance 
ratings in year t 
185,715 4,989 5,802 
Retain: with I/B/E/S actual earnings information to 
calculate earnings forecast errors  
184,843 4,906 5,788 
Retain: with stock price information at the beginning of 
year t  
179,628 4,746 5,751 
Retain: with financial data such as market value and 
market-to-book ratio 
144,120 3,875 5,455 
Retain: with sufficient information to calculate standardized 
variables 
140,202 3,519 5,336 
Final earnings forecast sample       140,202 3,519 5,336 
 
This table presents the procedures to construct the sample for the analyst performance test. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Glassdoor Ratings for Brokerage Firms 
 
 
(1) 
Mean ratings 
from analysts 
(2) 
Mean ratings 
from non-
analysts 
(1) – (2) 
Overall 3.291 3.247 0.044 
Company & Benefits 3.184 3.120 0.064 
Work-Life Balance 3.338 3.405 -0.067* 
Senior Management 3.053 2.934 0.119*** 
Culture & Values 3.322 3.090 0.232*** 
Career Opportunities 3.161 3.038 0.123*** 
Approves of CEO 0.302 0.253 0.049* 
Outlook 0.247 0.146 0.101*** 
Recommends 0.287 0.179 0.108*** 
# of Words in Review 7.555 5.483 2.072*** 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A presents the (unstandardized) descriptive statistics for the sample used in the tests of the 
earnings forecast timeliness and accuracy. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the sample 
used in the tests of analyst career outcomes. See the Appendix for the variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Sample for Earnings Forecast Timeliness and Accuracy Tests (n = 140,202) 
Variable Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
Work-Life Balance 3.238 0.640 3.000 3.284 3.563 
Forecast Error 0.018 0.037 0.002 0.006 0.016 
Forecast Timeliness 5.657 0.516 5.666 5.892 5.900 
Forecast Frequency 4.458 2.618 3.000 4.000 6.000 
Broker Size 4.259 0.753 3.784 4.419 4.745 
Number of Industries 3.489 2.290 2.000 3.000 5.000 
Number of Firms 17.245 8.934 12.000 17.000 22.000 
Firm Experience 4.830 3.858 2.000 4.000 7.000 
Firm Size 8.275 1.662 7.120 8.208 9.412 
Market-to-Book 4.036 4.433 1.657 2.676 4.465 
 
Panel B: Sample for Analyst Career Outcome Tests (n = 13,964) 
Variable Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
Work-Life Balance 3.263 0.627 3.018 3.294 3.579 
AA Award 0.119 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Promotion 0.019 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Forecast Accuracy 0.508 0.577 0.488 0.627 0.720 
Forecast Boldness 0.389 0.439 0.211 0.309 0.457 
Forecast Optimism 0.513 0.185 0.406 0.500 0.619 
Forecast Frequency 4.394 2.071 3.098 4.000 5.294 
Forecast Timeliness 4.409 0.580 4.185 4.522 4.735 
Broker Size 4.234 0.831 3.714 4.425 4.754 
Number of Industries 2.712 1.915 1.000 2.000 4.000 
Number of Firms 13.066 7.846 6.000 13.000 18.000 
Firm Experience 3.861 2.458 1.898 3.333 5.319 
Beta 1.163 0.335 0.943 1.134 1.355 
Firm Size 8.776 1.363 7.879 8.851 9.721 
Market-to-Book 4.403 5.070 2.006 3.092 4.862 
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Table 4 
Work-Life Balance and Earnings Forecast Accuracy and Timeliness 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equations (1) and (2). Forecast 
Error = the absolute value of the analyst’s earnings forecast for firm i minus firm i’s actual EPS in year 
t. Forecast Timeliness = the natural logarithm of the number of days between the analyst’s earnings 
forecast for firm i and the announcement date of firm i’s actual EPS in year t. Work-Life Balance = the 
work-life balance rating of the analyst’s brokerage firm submitted by analysts in year t. Other variables 
are defined in the Appendix. Except for Work-Life Balance, all of the continuous variables are scaled to 
range from 0 to 1 within each firm-year (Clement and Tse 2003). The t-statistics (in brackets) are 
calculated based on the standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable 
Forecast  
Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Forecast 
 Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Forecast 
 Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Work-Life Balance 0.0049** -0.0021 -0.0340*** 0.0753***   
 (1.99) (-0.45) (-3.51) (3.53)   
Work-Life Balance2   0.0063*** -0.0126***   
   (3.97) (-3.70)   
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|     0.0113*** -0.0191*** 
     (2.89) (-2.67) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|     0.0095* -0.0194** 
     (1.94) (-2.43) 
Broker Size 0.0288*** -0.0402*** 0.0338*** -0.0499*** 0.0323*** -0.0484*** 
 (4.66) (-4.14) (5.32) (-5.29) (5.29) (-5.01) 
Number of Industries 0.0142*** 0.0006 0.0136*** 0.0019 0.0140*** 0.0014 
 (3.03) (0.08) (2.91) (0.28) (2.94) (0.20) 
Number of Firms -0.0055 0.0960*** -0.0055 0.0961*** -0.0056 0.0962*** 
 (-0.79) (9.75) (-0.80) (9.86) (-0.79) (9.84) 
Firm Experience 0.0204*** 0.2542*** 0.0201*** 0.2544*** 0.0202*** 0.2544*** 
 (5.95) (44.52) (5.85) (44.04) (5.88) (44.09) 
Forecast Frequency 0.0876***  0.0874***  0.0876***  
 (15.09)  (15.17)  (15.14)  
Forecast Timeliness 0.2386***  0.2392***  0.2390***  
 (52.90)  (53.22)  (52.86)  
Intercept 0.1656*** 0.6783*** 0.2204*** 0.5683*** 0.1719*** 0.6847*** 
 (18.11) (37.27) (13.84) (16.41) (26.70) (69.92) 
N 140,202 140,202 140,202 140,202 140,202 140,202 
Adj. R-squared 0.086 0.096 0.086 0.097 0.086 0.096 
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Table 5 
Work-Life Balance and Analyst Career Outcomes 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the probit regression of Equation (2). AA Award = an 
indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional 
Investor in year t and zero otherwise. Promotion = an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves 
to a top 10% largest brokerage firm in year t and zero otherwise. Work-Life Balance = the work-life 
balance rating of the analyst’s brokerage firm in year t. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. The 
z-statistics (in brackets) are calculated based on the standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, 
and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable AA Award Promotion  AA Award Promotion AA Award Promotion 
Work-Life Balance 0.0071 -0.1203 4.2380*** 3.4099**   
 (0.07) (-1.20) (2.79) (2.25)   
Work-Life Balance2   -0.6845*** -0.5828**   
   (-2.85) (-2.22)   
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|     -0.9575*** -0.7765** 
     (-3.74) (-2.25) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|     -1.0861*** -0.9363*** 
     (-3.40) (-2.61) 
Forecast Accuracy 0.0634 0.1715*** 0.0648 0.1793*** 0.0701 0.1825*** 
 (1.56) (3.47) (1.56) (3.51) (1.64) (3.50) 
Forecast Boldness 0.0370 0.0567 0.0296 0.0509 0.0234 0.0507 
 (0.68) (1.05) (0.55) (0.97) (0.43) (0.97) 
Forecast Optimism -0.2953* 0.1650 -0.2808* 0.1580 -0.2630* 0.1573 
 (-1.90) (1.19) (-1.85) (1.13) (-1.77) (1.10) 
Forecast Frequency 0.0504** -0.0473 0.0505** -0.0472 0.0523** -0.0450 
 (2.04) (-1.56) (2.10) (-1.59) (2.23) (-1.57) 
Forecast Timeliness 0.1636** 0.2240*** 0.1656*** 0.2407*** 0.1760*** 0.2486*** 
 (2.56) (3.01) (2.60) (3.47) (2.78) (3.62) 
Broker Size 1.0109*** 0.2853** 0.8779*** 0.1946* 0.8535*** 0.2059* 
 (6.97) (2.48) (6.58) (1.70) (6.76) (1.88) 
Number of Industries 0.0430*** -0.0308* 0.0441*** -0.0323* 0.0444*** -0.0339* 
 (2.69) (-1.81) (2.76) (-1.83) (2.75) (-1.90) 
Number of Firms 0.0739*** 0.0122** 0.0737*** 0.0122** 0.0738*** 0.0118** 
 (6.26) (2.27) (6.38) (2.33) (6.41) (2.32) 
Firm Experience 0.1603*** -0.0005 0.1628*** 0.0002 0.1654*** 0.0003 
 (7.65) (-0.03) (7.86) (0.02) (8.27) (0.02) 
Beta 0.0232 0.0726 0.0328 0.0743 0.0358 0.0732 
 (0.25) (0.96) (0.37) (0.99) (0.41) (0.97) 
Firm Size 0.2260*** 0.0644*** 0.2194*** 0.0583*** 0.2161*** 0.0598*** 
 (6.17) (3.44) (6.25) (3.06) (6.31) (3.05) 
Market-to-Book 0.0089** 0.0063 0.0091** 0.0061 0.0089** 0.0055 
 (2.43) (1.37) (2.39) (1.33) (2.32) (1.20) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 13,964 13,964 13,964 13,964 13,964 13,964 
Pseudo R-squared 0.368 0.068 0.381 0.085 0.388 0.092 
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Table 6 
Office-Level Work-Life Balance 
 
This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1) and (2) (Panel A) and Equation (3) 
(Panel B) with the work-life balance rating of the analyst’s office in year t. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. The t- and z-statistics (in brackets) are calculated based on the standard errors 
clustered at the broker level. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Analyst Performance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable 
Forecast 
 Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Forecast 
 Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Work-Life Balance -0.0217* 0.0538**   
 (-1.71) (2.61)   
Work-Life Balance2 0.0040** -0.0093***   
 (2.07) (-2.81)   
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|   0.0099*** -0.0176** 
   (2.90) (-2.37) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|   0.0110** -0.0170* 
   (2.01) (-1.98) 
Broker Size 0.0351*** -0.0543*** 0.0358*** -0.0541*** 
 (4.36) (-3.91) (4.51) (-3.86) 
Number of Industries 0.0147** -0.0102 0.0148** -0.0106 
 (2.49) (-1.11) (2.46) (-1.15) 
Number of Firms -0.0148 0.0971*** -0.0147 0.0973*** 
 (-1.60) (8.12) (-1.56) (8.09) 
Firm Experience 0.0217*** 0.2559*** 0.0217*** 0.2558*** 
 (4.33) (33.16) (4.31) (33.17) 
Forecast Frequency 0.0902***  0.0903***  
 (12.17)  (12.28)  
Forecast Timeliness 0.2274***  0.2274***  
 (43.84)  (43.54)  
Intercept 0.2146*** 0.6218*** 0.1812*** 0.7038*** 
 (9.27) (19.48) (26.62) (66.57) 
N 67,500 67,500 67,500 67,500 
Adj. R-squared 0.077 0.097 0.078 0.097 
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Table 6 (Cont.) 
Office-Level Work-Life Balance 
 
Panel B: Analyst Career Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AA Award Promotion AA Award Promotion 
Work-Life Balance 1.1757*** 0.8923*   
 (2.92) (1.78)   
Work-Life Balance2 -0.1777*** -0.1436*   
 (-2.71) (-1.71)   
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|   -0.4484*** -0.2478 
   (-2.67) (-1.30) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|   -0.4085*** -0.2625** 
   (-3.20) (-2.31) 
Forecast Accuracy 0.0490 0.1242 0.0529 0.1260** 
 (0.75) (1.55) (0.82) (2.27) 
Forecast Boldness 0.0148 -0.0042 0.0106 -0.0032 
 (0.16) (-0.05) (0.12) (-0.04) 
Forecast Optimism -0.2250 -0.0222 -0.2100 -0.0239 
 (-1.41) (-0.11) (-1.35) (-0.12) 
Forecast Frequency 0.0646** -0.0324 0.0661** -0.0321 
 (2.27) (-1.08) (2.35) (-1.40) 
Forecast Timeliness 0.1827** 0.3257*** 0.1864** 0.3273*** 
 (2.09) (3.43) (2.12) (2.97) 
Broker Size 0.8482*** 0.1998 0.8257*** 0.1970* 
 (5.90) (1.63) (5.84) (1.86) 
Number of Industries 0.0489* -0.0608** 0.0479* -0.0605*** 
 (1.88) (-2.33) (1.83) (-2.59) 
Number of Firms 0.0699*** 0.0112* 0.0701*** 0.0112* 
 (6.89) (1.80) (6.90) (1.85) 
Firm Experience 0.1940*** 0.0138 0.1944*** 0.0134 
 (9.26) (0.89) (9.34) (0.60) 
Beta 0.2228* -0.0541 0.2319* -0.0547 
 (1.76) (-0.41) (1.87) (-0.36) 
Firm Size 0.2527*** 0.0547** 0.2524*** 0.0545** 
 (5.99) (2.04) (6.00) (2.00) 
Market-to-Book 0.0073** 0.0113** 0.0072** 0.0112** 
 (2.30) (2.07) (2.27) (2.38) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
N 6,731 6,731 6,731 6,731 
Pseudo R-squared 0.363 0.074 0.367 0.075 
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Table 7 
The Effects of Work-Life Balance on Male and Female Analysts 
 
This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1) and (2) (Panel A) and Equation (3) 
(Panel B) on the matched samples of male analysts and female analysts who work at the same 
brokerage firms and follow the same industries in year t. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The t- and z-statistics (in brackets) are calculated based on the standard errors clustered at the 
broker level. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Analyst Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable 
Forecast  
Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Forecast 
 Error 
Forecast  
Timeliness 
Female 0.0322 0.1807** 0.0244*** 0.0023 
 (0.54) (2.45) (2.66) (0.31) 
Work-Life Balance  -0.0520** 0.1374**   
 (-2.04) (2.63)   
Work-Life Balance × Female 0.0004 -0.1118**   
 (0.01) (-2.49)   
Work-Life Balance2 0.0107** -0.0226***   
 (2.50) (-2.84)   
Work-Life Balance2 × Female -0.0016 0.0180**   
 (-0.28) (2.54)   
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|   0.0228*** -0.0281* 
   (3.51) (-1.82) 
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| × Female   -0.0101 0.0226 
   (-1.26) (1.32) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|   0.0246 -0.0298 
   (1.40) (-1.61) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| × Female   0.0063 0.0290* 
   (0.24) (1.68) 
Intercept & Controls Included Included Included Included 
N 21,292 21,292 21,292 21,292 
Adj. R-squared 0.085 0.098 0.085 0.097 
     
P-value for F-test: Work-Life Balance + Work-Life 
Balance × Female = 0   
0.0783 0.6365   
P-value for F-test: Work-Life Balance2 + Work-Life 
Balance2 × Female = 0   
0.0671 0.6089   
P-value for F-test: |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| + 
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| × Female = 0   
  0.0485 0.7749 
P-value for F-test: |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| + 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| × Female = 0   
  0.0769 0.9619 
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Table 7 (Cont.) 
The Effects of Work-Life Balance on Male and Female Analysts 
 
Panel B: Analyst Career Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AA Award Promotion AA Award Promotion 
Female 21.5729*** 15.4123*** 0.0569 0.1425 
 (3.54) (2.97) (0.50) (0.95) 
Work-Life Balance  13.8013*** 12.1740***   
 (3.41) (3.60)   
Work-Life Balance × Female -12.7730*** -9.3966***   
 (-3.28) (-2.67)   
Work-Life Balance2 -2.0745*** -1.9106***   
 (-3.22) (-3.35)   
Work-Life Balance2 × Female 1.9066*** 1.4420**   
 (3.09) (2.44)   
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|   -1.7773** -1.0856 
   (-2.50) (-1.58) 
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| × Female   1.1944** 0.1326 
   (2.00) (0.18) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|   -1.9027*** -1.2839*** 
   (-5.51) (-3.52) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| × Female   1.6246*** 0.7920* 
   (4.16) (1.68) 
Intercept and Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
N 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386 
Pseudo R-squared 0.405 0.099 0.409 0.102 
     
P-value for F-test: Work-Life Balance + Work-Life 
Balance × Female = 0   
0.4760 0.2714   
P-value for F-test: Work-Life Balance2 + Work-Life 
Balance2 × Female = 0   
0.4458 0.2718   
P-value for F-test: |Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| + 
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance| × Female = 0   
  0.1147 0.0110 
P-value for F-test: |Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| + 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance| × Female = 0   
  0.3629 0.1436 
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Table 8 
Alternative Performance Measure: Stock-Recommendation Profitability 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (4). Buy 
Recommendations include analysts’ strong buy and buy recommendations. Sell Recommendations 
include analysts’ hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations. BHAR = the natural logarithm of 
one plus the buy-and-hold market-adjusted return to the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm 
i. Work-Life Balance = the work-life balance rating of the analyst’s brokerage firm submitted by 
analysts in year t. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics (in brackets) are 
calculated based on the standard errors clustered by broker and by month. *, **, and *** indicate 
two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Buy Recommendations Sell Recommendations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR 
Work-Life Balance 0.0316** 
 
0.0150  
 (2.01) 
 
(1.23)  
Work-Life Balance2 -0.0048**  -0.0026  
 (-2.28)  (-1.21)  
|Abn. Pos. Work-Life Balance|  -0.0130***  -0.0053 
  (-2.72)  (-0.94) 
|Abn. Neg. Work-Life Balance|  -0.0123*  -0.0058 
  (-1.71)  (-1.52) 
Broker Size 0.0097*** 0.0085** 0.0073*** 0.0072*** 
 (2.93) (2.58) (3.17) (3.10) 
Number of Industries 0.0020 0.0021 0.0013 0.0013 
 (1.08) (1.10) (0.84) (0.84) 
Number of Firms -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (-0.56) (-0.55) (-1.13) (-1.13) 
Firm Experience 0.0028*** 0.0028*** -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (3.59) (3.57) (-0.40) (-0.40) 
Firm Size 0.0031 0.0030 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.63) (0.60) (4.52) (4.52) 
Market-to-Book -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0019* -0.0019* 
 (-2.12) (-2.11) (-1.71) (-1.71) 
Beta -0.0317** -0.0317** -0.0316* -0.0317* 
 (-2.16) (-2.17) (-1.79) (-1.79) 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
N 27,885 27,885 33,664 33,664 
Adj. R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.027 
 
 
 
 
 
